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THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT THE ESSENCE OF LAW:
A DISPUTE BETWEEN HART AND DWORKIN
Petrus CKL Bello
Abstract
Does the law merely contain rules? Or does it also include morality? The debate
between H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin revolved around this very issue.
Hart considered the law is nothing more than a set of rules whereas Dworkin
believed that the law contains not only the rules but also principles which are
morality and justice. This paper is trying to explore the issue of the relationship
of law and morality in the context of this debate between Hart and Dworkin. The
debate itself is very significant in the study of law. Following their arguments
we can learn a lot about how the law should be understood and practiced. By
listening to their whole debate we will also know that Hart’s positivistic thought
and Dworkin’s tendency towards the natural law are not mutually negating.
Hart Positivism is not anti-morality. It is precisely through positivism which he
defended Hart aims at safeguarding the law by morality; whereas Dworkin has
shown what had previously forgotten by the legal positivistic way of thinking,
that is moral principles are integral parts of the law.

Keywords: H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, legal positivism, the primary rules
and secondary rules, principles, soft positivism, theoretical disputes.
I.

Introduction

Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907-1992) and Ronald Dworkin (1931present) are two of the most prominent contemporary legal thinkers. Hart has
successfully brought back the attraction of legal studies into its place. On the
other hand, Dworkin, who is known as the fiercest critic of positivism, has been
successful in linking the study of law with other disciplines such as politics and
ethics.
Hart’s book that makes him the most influential thinkers of more recent
developments of legal positivism is The Concept of Law (first published 1961)
and the most prominent topic of the book is his understanding of the law that
is practically exceptional. Law, according to Hart is the legal union of primary

  Alumnus of Post Graduate Program at the University of Indonesia and Post Graduate Program at
Driyarkara School of Philosophy. A Philosophy of Law lecturer at Faculty of Law in Christian University of
Indonesia (UKI), a legal practitioner, and the founder of Bello and Partners Advocates & Legal Consultants.

Several points lead to Hart’s positivism are his assumptions (a) that law as a command over men;
(b) that there is no connection between law and moral norms or among what it is and what should be; (c)
of an explication over a meaning of law concept should be differ from  history and social study, and critical
assesment over a law concept should be appropriate to morality, social objectives and its purpose, etc; (d) a
set of law system is no other then a “closed logical system” where proper decision can be infered from sets
of law that have been promulgated; solely appropriate to rational reasoning; (5) unlike factual judgement,
moral judgement can not be established in order of rasional argument and evidance; (non-cognitivism in
ethics). H.L.A., Hart. (1994). The Concept of Law, Oxford : The Clarendon Press. p., 302.
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and secondary rules. The primary rules include rules on the liability rules that
impose liability or obligation. Meanwhile secondary rules includes the rules of
the criteria in identifying the validity sets of law that appropriate in the legal
system (rule of recognition), providing authority rules for the legislature to
change or generate new law (rule of change), and rule which authorizes the
court to decide matters of law and procedure to follow (rule of adjudication).
The primary rules govern behaviors of the society, while secondary rules
centered on the question of how primary rules are created, developed, deleted,
interpreted and formally defined. It appears in the beginning that secondary
rules perform as a gauge to verify the validity of the primary rules. Consequently,
law in Hart’s view is a field that is independent, and therefore must be judged
on its own internal elements; the validity of a law is hereby determined by the
relationship between these two elements, its validity is not judged based on
moral principles, a sense of justice, or other social goals.
Ronald Dworkin, one of the most outstanding legal philosopher of modern
age on the other hand, put critical assessment over Hart’s view about the nature
of law as briefly described above, which centered on several issues. According
to Dworkin, Hart’s legal theory first of all solely as a compound of primary and
secondary rules ignores absolutely moral principles, whereas in fact, insists
Dworkin, moral principles have its fundamental role in the theory of law.
Secondly, regarding significant concepts in Hart’s legal philosophy as the rule of
recognition, Dworkin believes it is a concept which is inadequate in explaining
the validity of the law concepts.
This paper will examine the debate between Hart and Dworkin on the
relationship of law and morality. First of all I’m going to explore their arguments
and expose their dissimilarities. Then I would like to argue that law and morality
are inseparable. The law is not just a pile of legislation rather an aspiration to
promote a just and dignified life.
II. Hart and the Law as Rules

It seems to me that this following quotation represents all Hart
understanding of the nature of law. In his The Concept of Law, Hart wrote,
“If we go back and consider the structure ensuing from the combination
of primary rules that imposes obligation with secondary rules of recognition,
change, and court rulings, it is clear that we have had not only the core of the
legal system, but a very solid basic device for analyzing what is by most legal
experts (jurists) and political theorist regarded as a puzzle".
Hart’s legal philosophy can be seen as a retortion to what was developed
by John Austin (1790-1859). The specificity of the legal philosophy of Austin
centered in what was called a command (command) imposed sanctions enforced
by the sovereign power. Hart retorted to the idea of Austin. According to Hart,
the law as a command fails when facing latest and factual cases. This failure
of the legal theory based commands due to a combination of the constitutive


I refer to Hart’s idea saying that he is trying to construct new understanding on law which is sets
of rule that influences primary and secondary rules. Hart, (1997). op.cit., p. 80

Hart, (1997). ibid., pp. 92-94.  

Unlike Hart, in his Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin see to believe that there is primacy of law,
‘law beyond law’. Dworkin, (1995). Law’s Empire. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 400-413.  
Dworkin also believes that apart from ‘sets of rules,’ law consist of ‘principles’. See, Dworkin (ed.), (1977).
The Philosophy of Law, Oxford : Oxford University Press. pp. 47-49.

Hart, (1997). ibid., p. 98.

Year 2 Vol. 1, January - April 2012

INDONESIA Law Review

~ 47 ~

elements of legal theory such as the idea of order, obedience, habits, and threats,
as generally accepted in command-based legal theory but does not produce an
idea of the rule.
On the contrary, Hart believed that without involving the notion of rules
we could not expect a detailed and adequate explanation on law even in the
very basic forms indeed. The law construing as legal rules can on the one hand
become the key to understand characters of impulsively command contained in
the law and on the other can be used to clarify the relationship of legal theory
with morality.
In order to strengthen his understanding of the rules, Hart began with
the idea about social rules. He believed that there are at least two concepts
on behavior which is first, behavior that is governed by the rules of behavior;
and secondly, habitual-based behavior. He also distinguished legal rules from
standards and rules of law from the commandments that contain threat. The
rule in itself according to Hart, consist of two fundamental aspects that is
external aspect and internal aspects. From the standpoint of the internal aspect
then appears awareness to comply with or admit the rules.
The two aspects of rules play role in arising acceptance and admittance
awareness to the rules in the way that human internal perspective tends to lead
to a demand which direct men behave in accordance with the rules. Then, social
pressure suffered by a person or a special group will be labeled deviant if whose
behavior fits to no rules.
Hart distinguished rules into two types namely rules which direct one’s
deed, or refraining from acting, and the type of rule that authorizes a person to
be able to do something legally such as in terms of making wills and contracts.
On these distinctions, Hart came up with formulation of the nature of law which
consists of two types of rules, primary and secondary rules. The combination
of these two types of rules is Hart’s fundamental understanding of philosophy
of law. Law, in Hart’s perspective is hereby a reciprocal relationship between
primary and secondary rules, in other words is the interplay of primary and
secondary rules.
Besides the primary rules control human behaviors through the creation
of actions liability relating, this rules can in contrast fail to inflict obligation. But,
although the primary rules play a main role in the establishment of coercive
obligations, it could not construct legal system as well. The creation of a legal
system needs mainly reliable categories which explicitly admit an authority
making law that includes construction of a new form of law and its enforcement,
particularly in terms of conflict resolutions. These rules are called secondary
rules of law which existence is recognized to the extent related to the primary
rules. As a result, a social bonds based without help on the primary rules would
suffer some potential impediments that is, of uncertainty; static; and inefficient.
Uncertainty, in Hart’s perspective, can be overcome by what is included
in the secondary rules as a rule of recognition; which rules allow a community
to identify the primary rules with reference to the characteristics taken by an
authority of a community. The rule of recognition includes authoritative texts
for instance laws and legislative act; practices that have become habit, public
declarations of persons or court decisions in the past in cases of particular or
Hart, (1997). The Concept of Law, op.cit., p. 80.
Hart, (1997). The Concept of Law, ibid., pp. 55-59.

Hart, (1997). The Concept of Law, ibid., p. 82.
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specific.10
Other than uncertainty, rules are static; that means rules have no other
way of how discursively adjust any other rules to change environment, either
through the elimination of the previous rules or by introducing new rules. Next,
that the administration of the rules is inefficient because there is no specific
body possessed power to eventually find out certainty and have an authority to
set about the facts of violence or violation of law. To the weaknesses of static and
inefficient of primary rules, secondary rules would prefer perfected through the
concept of changing the rules (rules of changes) and the judge’s decision rules
(rules of adjudication).
For short, Hart seemed to give a very large portion to the rules. No other
matters beyond the rules that are considered as legal. For Hart, the principle
which says that there is still law beyond the law basically incredible because
the law merely defined and limited by rules that have been provided by the
rule of recognition, legal rights, the various duties, and power. Such a kind of
consideration reiterates claims of legal positivism that what legally referred as
the law is merely the rules.
Despite his deliberation reiterated legal positivism; Hart realized that the
rules themselves are not at all clear and definite. Rules have what is by Hart
known as an open-textured,11 which allows a judge to perform lavish decision
in deciding such a case based on personal considerations. By claiming rules as
an open texture, Hart admited the insufficiency of the concepts that consider the
formulation of a written law as the only reference in decision making to a case.
Faced with certain concrete situations, many legal standards can be directly
applied. Therefore, as anticipation towards severe criticism, Hart rejected
formalist or literalist view that applies law effusively.
Obviously, legal standard law cannot be granted in any certain situation
for any reasons but the application of it must be regarded in consideration to the
case faced law. In such a certain situation or circumstances, the court or a judge
is obliged to execute a diversity of considerations and options before making a
decision to a lawsuit. Hart, however, did not intend to maintain skepticism in law
which believes a precarious construe of a law. The uncertainty of interpretation
of a law could not ignore the fact that the system of law or act remains referential
to law enforcement officials and ordinary citizens who sustain by a particular
legal system.
It is not dubious that Hart’s tenacious view to these rules raises convincingly
numbers of decisive issues. Is it true that law simply concerning of rules? What
about the validity of a fact that judges sometimes have to refer to something
outside the rules in issuing a verdict? Does not this designate that rules are not
Hart, (1997). The Concept of Law, op.cit., p. 97.
Open texture, is English translation of a German word, Porosität which means permeate, refers
to the fact that subject of law is incapable or have no means just to formulate the language of law that
finally demand a subject of law to prepare for any conceived of possibilities. In his Essays in Jurisprudence
and Philosophy, Hart reqouted three of Wittgenstein’s most important views in philosophy of language
in German: (1) ‘Ich sagte von der Anwendung eines Wortes: sie sei nicht überall von Regeln begrenzt’: I
speak about the use of a word, which usage however is limited without any rules; (2) ‘Wirsind nict für alle
Moghlichkeiten seiner Anwendung mit Regeln ausgerustet’: We are fully equipped with any rules for all the
possibilities of such usage of a wod; (3) ‘Der Umfang des Begiriffs ist durch eine Grenze nicht abgeschlossen:
er ist nicht überall von Regeln begrenzt’: The range of a concept is not surrounded by a boundary: such a
kind of range is surrounded by no rules. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, op.cit., p. 274.  English
translation my own.
10
11
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at all clear and definite or imply what he does not intend to preserve, that is
skepticism in law? All these questions are, as identified by Ronald Dworkin,
breach of thought that pave the way for series of controversial amongst the two
outstanding legal philosophers.
III. Hart versus Dworkin

The debate between Hart and Dworkin is the most eminent discourse that
has ever happened in the history of contemporary legal philosophy. Though it
touches many themes, the focal point of the debate centered on the matter of
legality and morality. The focus itself could be formulated this way: whether
the law simply provides social rules or the law also contains moral rules? Is the
validity of the law determined by social facts or moral facts?12
A. Dworkin on the Law as Rule and Principle

Dworkin’s opposition against Hart was broadly summarized in two main
books, Taking Rights Seriously and Law’s Empire.13 Both of these two books
inquire about explanation just to make visible that Hart’s legal positivism and
his conviction that rules of law is a combination of primary and secondary rules,
is fundamentally inadequate and fails to explain the phenomenon of law. While
instigating with a wrangling argument, Dworkin simultaneously strengthened
his own understanding of law as well, that law contains not just the rules but
the principles at once.
Hart’s legal positivism, according to Dworkin is centered on three main
thesis which is of the pedigree thesis, discretion, and legal obligation thesis as
well.
1. Pedigree thesis reads that the law of a community is determined according
to unambiguous criterion, which means verifiable under the supreme law
(pedigree) or the way the law was adopted and developed. The verification
through the pedigree can be used to distinguish which law is valid and which
one is invalid. Evidently, the validity of a law is not determined by the content
of the law.
2. Discretion thesis comprehends that set of rules that are legitimate in
accordance to its source, is entirely of the law. Beyond such by decree
decision, neither standards nor legal principles are a law. In case that a rule
of law is not available for a certain case, or if it is available but such a kind
of rule has ambiguity in meaning, this imply that such a case could not be
decided according to this kind of rules or such a rule could not be applied to
such a case. The case was decided based on discretion.
3. Obligation thesis reads that a legal obligation, both command and prohibition
in order to do something, simply derived from the rules.
In Dworkin’s consideration, Pedigree thesis (1) contains two main concepts
which are: first, in every community which has a legal system, according to

12
See the complete explanation on the debate in Michael D. Bayles, (1992). Hart’s Legal Philosophy,
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, p. 165; bdk. Scott J. Shapiro, “The ‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate: A Short
Guide for the Perplexed”. University of Michigan Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, No. 77 (March, 2007). Accessed from SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968657.   
13
Ronald Dworkin, (1977). Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: Massachusetts  Harvard University
Press,; Ronald Dworkin, (1968).  Law’s Empire, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Balknap Press of Harvard
University Press.
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positivism, there exist a supreme law (pedigree) used to distinguish which is the
rule of law and which rule is not of law; secondly, the criterion of supreme law
in determining which is the rule of law and which rule is not of law is social fact,
namely the establishment of a law by the legislature, a court decision ever issued,
and enforcement by other regulatory agencies such as the presidential decree,
or regulation issued by the ministry concerning a particular case. Supreme law
prevailing in positivism, according to Dworkin, is always free from morality.
There is nothing but pedigree thesis, for Dworkin, which is intended to
exemplify the recognition rule that is Hart’s rule of recognition. For him, this rule
of recognition is nothing more than supreme law that determines the validity
of law based on the origin, genealogy, or the source. But Dworkin considered
this type of determination of validity of a law as inadequate, since such a kind
of determination ignores the fact that morality is also often justify the validity
of the law. The law is valid not just when it was made by the legislature, decided
by the court, or issued by any other authoritative institutions of but by morality
as well.
Dworkin’s view on the legal validity of law derived from his conviction
about the law; that law, for him, not simply contains the rules but likewise the
principles. He did not mean to say that the validity of the rule of law is determined
by the pedigree, but assents to the fact that the validity of the principles can be
verified by the moral content of the principles. Contrasting to the rule of law,
the appliance of a principle by a judge did not set by whether these principles
have ever been applianced in deciding a lawsuit or whether it contained in a
recognized source of legal propriety but because of its properness when applied
into a case.14 In other words, the content of the principles itself that determines
whether or not the principle can be applied. For instance, if the application of
the principle said “no one is allowed to take into account an advantage of his
crime”, judged unfairly applied in a particular case the principle itself is invalid.
Referring to the discretion thesis (2), in Dworkin’s perspective, Hart’s
positivism is exceedingly considered of law simply as rules or that rules explicitly
consist in the law. The consequences of such law model is, when a case does not
have rules, or the rules themselves less rigorous, it is imply that a judge should
be doing discretion. For Dworkin, the understanding of law as merely of rules
and its derivativeness, that is discretion, is basically insufficient.
In reference to the unbreakable cases, Dworkin has been trying to reinforce
his argument. A judge, according to him, in addressing to the cases which is
complicated, could never be allowed to decide the case at his discretion as the
consequence that he is bound by legal principles. In case that some number of
rules can not be imposed upon certain cases, it does not suggest the judge’s
ruling against the unbreakable case can take place outside the law. However, the
verdict is still a legal decision in the sense that based on the existing sources of
law, that is to say principles to which the judges are in confined.
The general criterion of the appliance of rules, in Dworkin’s perspective
referred to be “all or nothing”, or otherwise explicit. For instance, if a valid rule
states that a testament must be witnessed by three persons, it implies that a
testament witnessed by two persons could not become a legitimate testament.
Therefore, it is the rules that rigorously binding can not be in contrast with other
rules. If there is a contradiction, as much happen in local government regulations
14

Roland Dworkin, (1977). Taking Rights Seriously, op.cit., p. 40.
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issued in recent years, it is certainly that one of these rules are invalid.
On the other hand, the principles of the law that is not stringent can oppose
to each other. Principles have, according to Dworkin, a “level dimension”.15
Therefore, if the principles contrast to each other, of appropriate methods to
resolve conflict among rules are to choose a principle that has a stronger level
and disregard the principle that has weaker levels. Principle which states that
no one is allowed to take into account an advantage of his crime, for instance, for
Dworkin, could not be applied consistently in the sense that all cases should be
subjected to this principle.
In many cases this principle becomes a less stringent principle and some
people would take into account the benefit from their actions to contravene the
law.16 One might have committed violations of law such as breach of contract or
employment agreement to get a higher wages elsewhere. Because the person
has violated the contract, he will pay compensation as stipulated in the contract
but when he moved his permanent workplace, he will get benefits, that is to say
higher wages from his new company.
A law which is perceived simply of rules ignores the principles. Yet, to
the contrary, on the practical level of law, principles often applied vigorously.
According to Dworkin, a judge is bound not just by the rules but by the
principles as well. For example, the principle said that no one is allowed to take
into account an advantage of his crime committed. Dworkin gave an example of
using this principle in the murder of a grandfather by his grandson that called
public attention that time (Riggs against Palmer case).17
Judges, in this case, according to Dworkin, did not act outside the law
because judges are bound by the principles. Dworkin argued, if principles bind
to no judges, consequently that rules would bind to none of them. An example
of binding principles is the principle of “legislative supremacy”, that is set of
principles that binds the judges to give priority over the rules derived from the
legislators. Another principle which is binding on the judge is related to the
precedent, namely the principles relating to the issue of justice and consistency
in law appliance.18 Therefore, according Dworkin, without binding principles,
then the rules would not be binding on the judge.19
Another argument suggests that judges are bound by the principle is that,
in making changes over the rules, judges absolutely show the principle applied in
making these changes. In the case of Riggs against Palmer, it is the principle that
no one is allowed to take into account the benefit of his or her crime committed
which verifies judges’ decision.
Roland Dworkin, (1977). Taking Rights Seriously, op.cit., p. 26.
Roland Dworkin, (1977). Taking Rights Seriously, ibid., p. 25.
17
In 1889, New York judicial tribunal to the case Riggs against Palmer, should decided whether
the grandson, whose name appered in the testament, inherits or has a right of inheritence in the property
of grandfather following the letter’s death, eventhough the grandson has murdered his grandfather, from
whom he received testament to inherit the properties. The tribunal had admited in line with the law that
the grandson whose name appeared in the testament was the only heir, and that has the right of inheritence
over the properties of his grandfather. But, when the case reached its highest development, the tribunal
had to decide that not any law nor contract is beyond the control of general and fundamental principle of
common law, that is to say that no one is allowed to take into account the benefit of his criminal, and the
grandson by the verdict of the tribunal has no right of inheritence over the properties of his grandfather.
Roland Dworkin, (1977). Taking Rights Seriously, ibid, p. 23.
18
Roland Dworkin, (1977). Taking Rights Seriously, ibid.,  pp. 37-8.
19
Roland Dworkin, (1977). Taking Rights Seriously, ibid., p. 38.
15
16
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Thesis of legal obligations (3) which states that legal obligations derived
from the rules is inadequate because it would turn towards the ex post facto law
or retroactive. Consequently, if a case happens before the promulgation of a law,
then the judge must create new law through discretion. Dworkin believed that
this explanation is inadequate because it would imply that judges can issued
a verdict over a case with the new rule was made after a case occurs, in other
words the judges themselves intervene retroactive principle.20 An adequate
legal view is that judges, in facing of such severe cases, by using the principles of
the relevant laws, provide commentary on the existing rules, not to create new
law through discretion.
B. Soft Positivism: Hart’s Defensive Argument

As it has already been described above, Hart’s legal positivism is
summarized by his opponent in debate into three theses that is pedigree,
discretion, and the thesis of legal obligations. Pedigree thesis refers to Hart’s
concept of rules regarding recognition or the rule of recognition, that the legal
validity of law is determined by social facts, support by the power enforcement
agencies but not by morality. Hart blamed Dworkin over such assessment.
According to Hart, rule of recognition as the legal validity criterion of law does
not encompass only pedigree aspects but at the same time virtue and justice.21
Hart even sincerely admitted in some legal systems the validity criterion
of morality of law. For Hart, the rule of recognition as the definitive validity
criterion of law is not univocal. Each of community has its different provisions.
Rule of recognition can be either king’s decision, habit, court decisions, legislative
voting, or moral norms.
It seems that Hart has foreseen in advance of Dworkin’s wrangling
argument of the deficit of morality values unto rules. Whereas on the contrary,
Hart argued that the principle and morality, as far as socially accepted as valid __
as the judge and authorized officers have agreed upon in a certain legal systems
__ may become the final criterion of legal validity of the primary law. By adhering
to the view that morality can be part of the recognition rule, Hart called himself
as a soft positivist whom support soft positivism;22 and insisted that morality can
be the validity criterion of the law.
Following Hart’s defensive argument we can say that Dworkin’s delineation
of the rule of recognition by equating it with the supreme law is inappropriate.
It is necessary to emphasize that neither principles nor morality are usually
used as criterion to take account of specific rules into law but to omit the law
instead. This can be verified in the principle that no one is allowed to take into
account the benefit of the crime committed, which principle as has already been
described above, infringe a right of inheritance over properties bestowal by a
testament.23
Furthermore, in the discretion and legal liability thesis, Dworkin tends
to indict Hart as of simply admitted rules of law, while excluding the standards,
norms, and principles in the system of his legal philosophy. Identification of
law merely as rules directed Hart to remove discretion thesis. If a rule does not
Roland Dworkin, (1977). Taking Rights Seriously, op.cit., p. 44.
H.L.A Hart, (1983). “Postscript”, in, The Concept of Law, op.cit., p. 241.
22
H.L.A Hart, (1983). “Postscript” in, The Concept of Law, ibid., p. 250.
23
See, Michael D. Bayles, (1992). Hart’s Legal Philosophy, op.cit., p. 168.
20
21
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available for a certain cases, have must a judge make a decision outside the law
accordingly. In contrast, for Dworkin discretion may not happen because either
the rules or principles are bound to the judges.
To lay stress upon principles, Dworkin tended to criticize both of Hart’s
pedigree and discretion theses. The failure of pedigree thesis because of the
institutional sustenance does not prevail principles. The principles are valid not
just because it has ever applied by the court on the former cases, or it has ever
been written on the law, but more on because its appropriateness or relevance
to the case at hand. Arguments based on principles also be used to argue against
Hart’s thesis of discretion; that is to say since the judge is always bound by the
principles of law, the judge would not take extra-legal decision accordingly.
Binding characteristic of the principles upon the judges, according to Dworkin, is
not because the principles are socially intended to bind but because the content
of its morality.
Hart denied that he has developed a theory of law based solely on the
rules, and ignores the principles. Though in the Concept of Law he paid not much
attention to the principles but that does not mean he ignored the principles
altogether.24 Besides, Hart also did not consider the law merely as a rule that
is standard that has a characteristic “all-or-nothing” which could not be in
opposition to each other and would not have the dimension levels. Law is, for
Hart, all the standards which in a certain legal system be considered to have
authority. These standards, as has already mentioned, can be a standard that is
not conclusive or principles, which are socially conceded as binding.
By this explanation that elucidated his understanding of judge’s discretion,
we understand that it is apparently different from what have been described in
Dworkin’s. Discretion by the judge is done not because there are no conclusive
rules but because of the character of all standards, rules, and principles, which
are accepted as binding unto the judges, is always open and can not anticipate
all the possibilities that will occur. Discretion, therefore, could take place when,
the rules and principles are not sufficient to solve cases, since “the law does not
provide an answer in that case ... therefore to decide upon a case the court must
make visible law-making function ... discretion.”25
Dworkin objected to this answer, because by making discretion visible,
judges have made new law, which means punish ex post facto or retrospectively.
But according to Hart, both enactment and enforcement of law by understanding
differently the rules that exist, practically, have no significant effect. In facing a
sophisticated case, the judges according to Hart, possess no other duty except
“making the greatest moral judgment onto moral issues that might be his
problem.”26 So, there is nothing to justify the blame that Hart was not aware of
the obligation of judges in the standards of morality appliance unto unbreakable
cases.
C. Further Debate

Hart’s response to the grievance argument developed by Dworkin does
not satisfy him. After twenty years of their dispute, Dworkin again and again
strove against Hart’s positivism. In his Law’s Empire (1995), Dworkin delivered
Hart, (1983) . “Postscript”, in, The Concept of Law, op.cit., p. 259-60.
Hart, (1983). “Postscript”, in, The Concept of Law, ibid., p. 252.
26
Hart, (1983). “Postscript”, in, The Concept of Law, ibid., p. 254.
24
25
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a staunch defense of argument that legality is not simply determined by social
facts, but by moral facts all at once. To support his thesis, Dworkin designated
the fact of a “theoretical disagreement” in law, which according to him, has been
ignored by Hart.
Hart’s philosophy of law, which according to Dworkin based on what is
called plain-fact view, is identified by two principles that is: first, the legal basis
of any community is an agreement. If the officials agreed upon the fact f as a
fact for the legal basis of a legal system, that means the fact f is a legal basis of
that legal system; secondly, Hart argued that the kind of facts that could become
the basis of law is the apparent historical facts. Law is all about questions of
what has been promulgated by authorized institutions in the past. If in the past
authorized agency had declared that the thief should be put into jail for three
years, that’s the valid law.
Thus, according to positivism, all the problems of law will always be easily
resolved, that is by looking at books containing court’s decisions in the past or
at the legislation.27 These two principles, according to Dworkin, makes Hart
find difficulties to sufficiently explain the possibility of a common theoretical
disagreement in law. Legal disputes in Hart’s opinion are only centered on
empirical question; while Dworkin understood such disputes as dealing with
theoretical inquiries.
To attain a better understanding of Dworkin’s perspective on the theoretical
disputes law contained, we must first of all know his views about the law. Law,
says Dworkin, is closely related to daily practice by law participants, judges,
lawyers, and all the citizens. Participants in the practice of law aimed directly at
the decree of what law is through the legal process continuously evolving, filled
up with controversy, and entail interpretation activities. Each party can express
their opinions of each on the essence of the law. In such a situation, judges could
not hinder from engaging in the interpretation of what law desired.
How Hart respond to this allegation? Hart, as has already been mentioned,
disagreed with the idea that the validity of law is just determined by the factual
rules basis. Rules of recognition which is the final criterion of the validity of law
for Hart can be the substantives of morality which has been agreed upon. In
facing the sophisticated cases, Hart insisted that judges may agree to have them
interpreted based on moral values, even if they disagree which moral values that
should be applied in such cases.
However, Dworkin persisted that in such an unbreakable case judges
do not have a consensus on determining the validity of the law, therefore, they
should engage in ‘theoretical dispute’. Hereby, if an inclusive legal positivist
believes that the rule of recognition requires unbreakable cases to be decided in
reference to moral principles, it implies that the rule of recognition is no longer
a social rule.
IV. A Necessary Relationship between Law and Morality

The debate between Hart and Dworkin attempted to explain the nature
of law. It dealt with the question: ‘What are the essential aspects of the law, is it
purely a set of rules or it also contains morality?
As it was already summarized above, Hart stated that the law is a system of
rules that are complementary in a combination between primary and secondary
27

Dworkin, (1968). Law’s Empire, op.cit., p. 7.
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rules. By saying that the law is a rule, Hart did not mean to deny the existence
of morality. Hart admited that morality takes part in law yet morality is not a
significant and compulsory part of law. We can talk about law without referring
to moral issues. However Hart agreed that law at least should contains moral
values otherwise it will not gain moral justification.28 Nevertheless we can not
assume that morality then becomes an essential part of law. In other words, law
is not necessarily related to morality.
Hart agreed, nevertheless, that moral considerations can be included in
a legal decision, as much as morality may influence the law and justice is an
important aspect of the law. This is consistent with ‘the separation thesis’ which
admits that there is no absolute correlation between law and morality. Yet this
thesis should not be misunderstood as a call for separation of morality from law
as is regarded in the general assumptions of legal positivism.
Having a careful look at this, we could say that Hart’s stance remains
inadequate. In fact, laws are always connected with moral issues. Law does not
only deal with the number of rules but the content of the rule itself. As citizens
we can not receive punishment merely because of the rules and regulations,
but also because we believe that the rules are in accordance with our moral
outlook.
Yet arguing that the law and morality are absolutely integrated does not
mean that we should follow Dworkin’s opinion which holds that the principles
or morality compose a law and hence there is nothing else outside the law.
We should not confuse positive law with morality. Assuming the absolute
relationship between morality and law is not necessarily meant that both are
the same.
In the explanation below this paper would try to elaborate four points
wherein both morality and law are integrally related 29:
A. Law should have real concern on the objects of morality

Morality has objects. Some of them become integral objects of the law.
In other words, wherever there is law, there is also moral issue. Both law and
morality concern with human life and social living. This is why law is important.
This also explains why the normative debate about the legitimacy and authority
of the law has an important meaning.
B. Law should necessarily make moral claims

The law tells us what we should do, not just what will give us benefits,
and the law requires that we do not act against the interests of other persons,
except when the law permits otherwise. Each system contains legal norms to
be followed regardless of whether or not the norm is in accordance with the
interests of the people who are in the legal system. Legal order thus becomes
categorical reasons for action. It imposes a duty that citizens should comply.
Of course, though the law has absolute imperative but it does not make all its
claims morally infallible. It is very likely that legal imperatives, at some points,
contradict moral values. In the case as such, there is no moral obligation to

28
"Law according to Hart must include at least three moral content, namely, the prohibition of
violence, theft and fraud". Hart, (1983). The Concept of Law, op.cit., p. 193.
29
See. L. Green, “Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Moral”, University of Oxford Faculty of
Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 15/2008. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstrak=1136374
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follow the rule. But the fact that law has categorical imperative assumes that the
law has a valid and moral authority.
C. Law should promote justice (justice-apt)

A legal system, which is formally and procedurally fair can be misused
and bring harmful result. Legal systems that enforce fair rules, when applied
indiscriminately, will not be necessarily analogous with the sense of justice in
society. The fact that the administration and procedure of law did not ensure the
fulfillment of justice candidly reveals that law and justice or morality in general
not related. However, this fact can also be seen in reverse. It is precisely because
the law can be contrary to morality that we can say the law is a moral matter.
And when we see that law results in injustices, we are compelled to question that
law. The law is always scrutinized from the perspective of justice and morality.
Considerations of fairness applied to laws that aim to regulate the distribution of
burdens and benefits among citizens. Towards this kind of law we pose question
whether it has been applied fairly or not, does it promote justice or not.
The fact that there is an absolute correlation between law and morality
is very important. Not all human affairs closely related with justice, music or
poetry, for example. In the world of art it is quite irrelevant to ask whether a
particular music or poetry is fair or not. Criteria for good music or poetry is
internal. Good music is music that has harmonious, unified, and interesting
rhythm. We do not demand justice from music.
D. Law contains moral risks

As it has been stated above, the law can be used for purposes contrary to
morality. Thus, the assumption that the law has the character of goodness is not
entirely true. In fact, whenever law takes effect, the moral risks emerge. When the
law is enacted not only efficient tools of living are assured, but also new evils are
established: such as the oppression of the poor and the weak, the growing of the
new hierarchy, and the possible harassment through legal instruments against
people who fight for justice as what we commonly experience in Indonesia.
Although law has absolute virtues, it also contains the danger of harming human
rights. All of these point to the absolute relation between law and morality.
So far in this paper we have seen that there is an absolute relationship
between law and morality. It is acceptable for Hart and Dworkin that morality
should be a reference to the practice of law. Law is not meant to harm the
common good. Taking morality seriously is necessary for law to avoid a static
legal life, precisely because morality is always relative to the ever-changing life
situation.
V.

Conclusion

The above elucidations seem to prove that Dworkin was blaming Hart for
his negligence of morality and principles enclose to law practice. The validity of
law in Hart’s philosophy of law is simply determined by common or supreme
law, or legal basis that has social character. Such a basic understanding of law, in
Dworkin’s consideration is basically insufficient since it fits the argumentative
structure of law not by nature, where the answer to the question of what law is
cannot be found by simply referring to the practice of the courts in the past or
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in codex iuris civili; whereas the definitive understanding of what law is, always
involves a dispute that requires people to give the best answer based on moral
and political considerations related to the purpose of the existence of the legal
system itself. Hart, according to Dworkin, failed to explain the existence of such
dispute.
On the other hand, Hart agreed with Dworkin on the view that morality
can verify the validity of the law. Therefore, the rule of recognition which is
the validity criterion of the law, not merely in the form of institutional support
but also in the affirmation that morality and substantive justice adopted in the
practice of law. Hart likewise admitted that he considered theoretical disputes
less important, but he conceded that in facing unbreakable cases the judges
would make decision that was preceded by a careful debate about the principles
which are appropriate to be applied upon difficult cases at hand.
From this description it can be concluded that both Hart and Dworkin
acknowledged the role of morality in the law. Hart, who regarded law as a set
of rules, did not mean to reject morality. His emphasis on the importance of
rule simply reminds us that the law in the first place is a rule, and as a rule
it can conform or contradict morality. Moral criticism of the law is thus only
possible if the law is considered not as a moral rule itself. This is to say that the
argument which considers law as merely a set of rules and regulations is not
worth followed.
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